



2020 Cyber Crime Losses

By Victim Loss			
Crime Type	Loss	Crime Type	Loss
BEC/EAC	\$1,866,642,107	Overpayment	\$51,039,922
Confidence Fraud/Romance	\$600,249,821	Ransomware	**\$29,157,405
Investment	\$336,469,000	Health Care Related	\$29,042,515
Non-Payment/Non-Delivery	\$265,011,249	Civil Matter	\$24,915,958
Identity Theft	\$219,484,699	Misrepresentation	\$19,707,242
Spoofing	\$216,513,728	Malware/Scareware/Virus	\$6,904,054
Real Estate/Rental	\$213,196,082	Harassment/Threats Violence	\$6,547,449
Personal Data Breach	\$194,473,055	IPR/Copyright/Counterfeit	\$5,910,617
Tech Support	\$146,477,709	Charity	\$4,428,766
Credit Card Fraud	\$129,820,792	Gambling	\$3,961,508
Corporate Data Breach	\$128,916,648	Re-shipping	\$3,095,265
Government Impersonation	\$109,938,030	Crimes Against Children	\$660,044
Other	\$101,523,082	Denial of Service/TDos	\$512,127
Advanced Fee	\$83,215,405	Hacktivist	\$50
Extortion	\$70,935,939	Terrorism	\$0
Employment	\$62,314,015		
Lottery/Sweepstakes/Inheritance	\$61,111,319		
Phishing/Vishing/Smishing/Pharming	\$54,241,075		

Descriptors*		
Social Media	\$155,323,073	*These descriptors relate to the medium or tool used to facilitate the crime and are used by the
Virtual Currency	\$246,212,432	IC3 for tracking purposes only. They are available only after another crime type has been selected. Please see Appendix B for more

information regarding IC3 data.

** Regarding ransomware adjusted losses, this number does not include estimates of lost business, time, wages, files, or equipment, or any third-party remediation services acquired by a victim. In some cases, victims do not report any loss amount to the FBI, thereby creating an artificially low overall ransomware loss rate. Lastly, the number only represents what victims report to the FBI via the IC3 and does not account for victim direct reporting to FBI field offices/agents.



Underground Economy

<u>Communication</u>

- Criminal Forums
- Jabber
- IRC
- Signal, Whatsapp, etc.

<u>Criminal Forums</u>

- Multiple languages
- Carding/Varied
- Vetted
- Multiple levels of administration



• <u>Services</u>

- Money Laundering/Exchange
- Bulletproof Hosting
- VPN
- Coding
 - Malware
 - •Exploit Kits
- Installs
- Botnets as a service
- DDoS
- "Anti-Virus" check
- Spam/Phishing/Spear Phishing
- Hacking



Fuel Pump Skimming

- Very inexpensive (< \$1,000 per skimmer)
- Very profitable (\$20,000 a week per skimmer)
- Undetectable to the victim
- Common across the entire United States and Europe
- Two basic categories
 - Local crews
 - Travel crews
- Used for several types of fraud
 - Goods purchased by the obtaining criminals
 - Sold to other criminals
 - Used for fuel theft
- Often laundered using Gift Cards



Skimmer Tools













Bluetooth Skimmers







Skimming Convictions





Yusbel Parrado <u>28 Months</u>

Leonardo Prado <u>57 Months</u>



Miguel Fornaris <u>45 Months</u>



Andres Alvarez <u>39 Months</u>



60 Months



Pabel Vazquez <u>42 Months</u>



Ransomware

C The New York Times

Colonial Pipeline Paid Roughly \$5 Million in Ransom to Hackers

Colonial Pipeline made the ransom payment to the hacking group DarkSide after the cybercriminals last week held up the company's business...

6ABC

Cybercriminals demanding \$500,000 after hacking Delaware County, Pennsylvania computer network: Sources



Ed McAndrews, a cybercrime attorney and a former federal prosecutor, said "ransomware" hacking is running rampant across the country. Local...

Nov 25, 2020

Philadelphia Inquirer

Philly courts blame Russian hackers for virus attack that has crippled system for weeks

The virus that took down Philadelphia court system for an entire month is tied to Russian hackers.



WSJ Wall Street Journal

JBS Paid \$11 Million to Resolve Ransomware Attack

The ransom payment, in bitcoin, was made to shield JBS meat plants from further disruption and to limit the potential impact on restaurants,...

Jun 9, 2021



WSJ Wall Street Journal

A Hospital Hit by Hackers, a Baby in Distress: The Case of the First Alleged Ransomware Death

U.S.. A Hospital Hit by Hackers, a Baby in Distress: The Case of the First Alleged Ransomware Death. A lawsuit says computer outages from a... 1 month ago

B Bloomberg.com

CNA Financial Paid \$40 Million in Ransom After March ...

Payment bigger than previously disclosed ransoms, experts say \cdot Malware tied to Russian cybergang sanctioned by U.S. in 2019.






Jun 21, 2019



Ransomware






Business Email Compromise

- In 2020, the IC3 received 19,369 Business Email Compromise (BEC)/Email Account Compromise (EAC) complaints with adjusted losses over \$1.8 billion.
- Has evolved to include compromise of personal emails, compromise of vendor emails, spoofed lawyer email accounts, requests for W-2 information, the targeting of the real estate sector, and fraudulent requests for large amount of gift cards.
- In new variations, the victim is initially being scammed in non-BEC/EAC situations to include Extortion, Tech Support, Romance Scams, etc., that involved a victim providing a form of ID to a bad actor. That identifying information was then used to establish a bank account to receive stolen BEC/EAC funds and then transferred to a cryptocurrency account.



Business Email Compromise



An outline of how the business e-mail compromise is executed by some organized crime groups



Financial Fraud Kill Chain

- Minimum \$50,000
- International Transfer
- <72 Hours Since Wire Transfer Initiated
- FBI, USSS, FINCEN, NCFTA, FS-ISAC



Financial Fraud Kill Chain

- Minimum \$50,000
- Summary of the Incident:
- Victim Name:
- Victim Location (City, State):
- Originating Bank Name:
- Originating Bank Account Number:
- Beneficiary Name:
- Beneficiary Bank:
- Beneficiary Account Number:
- Beneficiary Bank Location (if available):
- Intermediary Bank Name (if available):
- SWIFT Number:
- Date:
- Amount of Transaction:
- Additional Information (if available) including "FFC"- For Further Credit; "FAV" In Favor



SolarWinds Orion

- Actors surreptitiously tampered with updates released by SolarWinds for its Orion platform, a suite of network management tools. A platform used to monitor, analyze and mange Information Technology.
- •Affected versions: 2019.4 through 2020.2.1 HF1
- Actors were exploiting SolarWinds Orion products containing SUNBURST malware to gain access to network traffic management systems.
- Seen on victim networks achieving full privileged access through trusted legitimate credentials, accounts, and applications. These credentials are often leveraged from victim-dedicated IP addresses.
- Once found, its up to the Cyber Security Professionals and System Administrators to determine if the actors used that vulnerability to pivot to a higher form of access.



SolarWinds Orion

- more than 425 of the U.S. Fortune 500
- all ten of the top ten US telecommunications companies
- all five branches of the U.S. military
- all five of the top five U.S. accounting firms
- the Pentagon
- the State Department
- the National Security Agency
- the Department of Justice
- The White House



Microsoft Exchange Email Server Hack

- This exploit remains ongoing, although significant mitigation measures are now in place
- Another malicious event attributed to Chinese state-sponsored actors
- Illustrates the speed and scale to which damage can spread
- Highlights the importance of timely application of software patches

(all of the following information derived from open sources)



MS Exchange Hack: Overview

- Scope assessment of impact grew rapidly by mid-March 2021 it was assessed that hundreds of thousands of organizations/servers were impacted worldwide
- Microsoft assessed that cloud-based Exchange email systems were not impacted
- Chinese state-sponsored APT hacking group "Hafnium" is attributed as the actor
- This attack is unique in the size, scope and un-targeted nature
- Victims are primarily small-to-medium-sized businesses



MS Exchange Hack: Contrast to Solar Winds

- MS Exchange hack is much larger in scope damage assessment is ongoing
- This hack is less discrete and therefore easier to detect, but more widely distributed



EBI FLASH FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, CYBER DIVISION

16 MAR 2021 Alert Number CP-000142-MW

WE NEED YOUR

administrators guard against the persistent malicious actions of cyber actors. This FLASH was coordinated with DHS-CISA. This FLASH has been released TLP:WHITE. Subject to standard copyright rules, **TLP:WHITE** information may be distributed without

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HELP!

If you find any of these indicators on your networks, or have related information, please contact **FBI CYWATCH** immediately.

Email: cywatch@fbi.gov

Phone: 1-855-292-3937

*Note: By reporting any related information to FBI CyWatch, you are assisting in sharing information that allows the FBI to track malicious actors and coordinate with private industry and the United States Government to prevent future intrusions and attacks.

Increase in PYSA Ransomware Targeting Education Institutions

Summary

FBI reporting has indicated a recent increase in PYSA ransomware targeting education institutions in 12 US states and the United Kingdom. PYSA, also known as Mespinoza, is a malware capable of exfiltrating data and encrypting users' critical files and data stored on their systems. The unidentified cyber actors have specifically targeted higher education, K-12 schools, and seminaries. These actors use PYSA to exfiltrate data from victims prior to encrypting victim's systems to use as leverage in eliciting ransom payments.

restriction.





Product ID: AA21-092A April 2, 2021

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APT Actors Exploit Vulnerabilities to Gain Initial Access for Future Attacks

SUMMARY

In March 2021 the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) and the Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA) observed Advanced Persistent Threat (APT) actors scanning devices on ports 4443, 8443, and 10443 for <u>CVE-2018-13379</u>, and enumerated devices for <u>CVE-2020-12812</u> and <u>CVE-2019-5591</u>. It is likely that the APT actors are scanning for these vulnerabilities to gain access to multiple government, commercial, and technology services networks. APT actors have historically exploited critical vulnerabilities to conduct distributed denial-of-service (DDoS) attacks, ransomware attacks, structured query language (SQL) injection attacks, spearphishing campaigns, website defacements, and disinformation campaigns.

TECHNICAL DETAILS

The FBI and CISA have information indicating APT actors are using multiple CVEs to exploit Fortinet FortiOS vulnerabilities. The FBI and CISA believe the APT actors are likely exploiting these Fortinet FortiOS vulnerabilities—CVE 2018-13379, CVE-2020-12812, and CVE-2019-5591—to gain access to multiple government, commercial, and technology services networks.

The APT actors may be using any or all of these CVEs to gain access to networks across multiple critical infrastructure sectors to gain access to key networks as pre-positioning for follow-on data exfiltration or data encryption attacks. APT actors may use other CVEs or common exploitation techniques—such as spearphishing—to gain access to critical infrastructure networks to pre-position for follow-on attacks.

To report suspicious or criminal activity related to information found in this Joint Cybersecurity Advisory, contact your local FBI field office at <u>https://www.fbi.gov/contact-us/field-offices</u>, or the FBI's 24/7 Cyber Watch (CyWatch) at (855) 292-3937 or by e-mail at <u>CyWatch@fbi.gov</u>. When available, please include the following information regarding the incident: date, time, and location of the incident; type of activity; number of people affected; type of equipment used for the activity; the name of the submitting company or organization; and a designated point of contact. To request incident response resources or technical assistance related to these threats, contact CISA at <u>Central@cisa.gov</u>.

Disclaimer: The information in this Joint Cybersecurity Advisory is provided "as is" for informational purposes only. FBI and CISA do not provide any warranties of any kind regarding this information or endorse any commercial product or service, including any subjects of analysis.

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Consider adding an email banner to emails received from outside your organization.

TLP:WHITE

MITIGATIONS

data resides.

are released.

access/RDP logs.

privilege in mind.

Disable hyperlinks in received emails.

CYBERSECURITY ADVISORY

associated files should be prevented.

Require administrator credentials to install software.

Use multifactor authentication where possible.

Implement network segmentation.

Immediately patch CVEs 2018-13379, 2020-12812, and 2019-5591.

If FortiOS is not used by your organization, add key artifact files used by FortiOS to your

organization's execution deny list. Any attempts to install or run this program and its

 Regularly back up data, air gap, and password protect backup copies offline. Ensure copies of critical data are not accessible for modification or deletion from the primary system where the

· Implement a recovery plan to restore sensitive or proprietary data from a physically separate,

Install updates/patch operating systems, software, and firmware as soon as updates/patches

Regularly change passwords to network systems and accounts, and avoid reusing passwords

for different accounts. Implement the shortest acceptable timeframe for password changes.
Disable unused remote access/Remote Desktop Protocol (RDP) ports and monitor remote

Audit user accounts with administrative privileges and configure access controls with least

segmented, secure location (e.g., hard drive, storage device, the cloud).

Organizations should take the following:

 Focus on awareness and training. Provide users with training on information security principles and techniques, particularly on recognizing and avoiding phishing emails.

Install and regularly update antivirus and anti-malware software on all hosts.

CONTACT INFORMATION

Recipients of this report are encouraged to contribute any additional information that they may have related to this threat.

For any questions related to this report or to report an intrusion and request resources for incident response or technical assistance, please contact:

- The FBI through the FBI Cyber Division or a local field office,
- CISA (888-282-0870 or <u>Central@cisa.gov</u>).

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FBI | CISA